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Order, Authority, and Law: 
On the Development of Modern Conceptions of 
Political Order,  
Legitimate Rule, and Law and How They are Challenged 
Nico Schröter*
ABSTRACT 
This essay examines the development of the Western conception of political order, which has 
changed considerably since its medieval origins. It has undergone a process of abstraction, 
secularisation, positivisation, and legalisation. In particular, the contemporary conception of 
political order, which I term Legalised Political Constructivism, emphasises the role of law as a 
means to structure political and social life. This essay shows that Legalised Political 
Constructivism is the result of historical attempts to justify political developments or to induce 
change, which leaves it open to challenge on empirical grounds. It concludes that normative 
political thought must engage with the social sciences in order to better understand the role that 
positive law can (and should) play as a constructive element in society. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since its medieval origins, the conception of political order has on its way to 
modernity changed considerably. It has undergone a process of abstraction, 
secularisation, positivisation, and legalisation. In particular, in its modern form it 
emphasises the role of positive law as a means to structure political and social 
life.  
This contemporary conception of political order, which I term Legalised 
Political Constructivism, can be explained as the result of historical attempts 
either to justify political developments on normative grounds, or to actively 
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induce political change. In particular, philosophical conceptions of political 
order were often used instrumentally to legitimise or entrench transitions 
between papal or monarchical authority and popular sovereignty. It is 
unsurprising, then, that some of its core assumptions and concepts – for 
example, the notion that political associations are the product of rational choices 
to protect individual and collective welfare or the role of positive law in political 
order – are inconsistent with what we nowadays know about political behaviour. 
This leaves Legalised Political Constructivism, with its insistence on the role of 
law to circumscribe political structures, open to criticism on empirical grounds. 
This prompts the challenge to reconcile normative political thought with 
theories of social behaviour propounded by the social sciences.  
I. MEDIEVAL ORIGINS: CATHOLIC ORDER AND THEOCRATIC 
GOVERNMENT 
Many concepts underlying modern political thought emerged during the 
medieval period and must be seen against this background. Until the High 
Middle Ages, political philosophy was considerably shaped by the cosmovision 
and doctrines of Christianity, which had attained influence by its establishment 
as the official church of the late Roman Empire by Theodosius I in 380 AD and 
– following the Western Empire’s decline – by the rise of the papacy to become
a political player. Its underlying rationale of a divinely created world, structured 
in a natural and strictly hierarchical order (a ‘Great Chain of Being’),1 remained 
prevalent throughout much of the Middle Ages.2 
The Structuring Force of Christian Theology 
The main consequences of Christian theology for political thought were 
threefold. Firstly, political order was considered ancillary to heteronomous, 
transcendental objectives. Early Christian philosophers like St Augustine of 
Hippo (354–430), in his text City of God, suggested that government was made 
* PhD student and research assistant at the Bucerius Law School in Hamburg (Germany)
(LL.M. 2016, LSE). My thanks go to Daniel Zwi of the LSE Law Review for his helpful 
editorial feedbacks. 
1 See generally Arthur Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea 
(HUP 1936). 
2 Michael White, Political Philosophy (2nd edn, OUP 2012) 124. 
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necessary only by the Fall of Man.3 Hence, its main purpose was the 
achievement of salvation (and the suppression of forces working to the 
contrary).4 This general rationale for political order was contrary to earlier 
Roman and Greek political thought, most prominently Aristotle (384–22 BC), 
who considered political life in the polis to be natural (and god-willed) human 
behaviour.5 
Linking political order primarily to transcendental objectives meant that, 
secondly, any rightful political authority had to be divinely bestowed (see, for 
example, Romans 13:1–7).6 Earthly authorities were therefore understood to be 
‘vicegerents of God’ and to act in the exercise of His will.7 This idea of 
delegated authority allowed for a certain abstraction of political power, as 
opposed to earlier pagan theories of kings as unchallengeable quasi-gods. At the 
same time, it contradicted those traditions which perceived political authority 
not as divinely bestowed, but rather derived from a compact between the ruler 
and his people, as for example in ancient Germania8 
Thirdly, the structure of government – being part of a greater, inherently 
consistent order – was considered to be (at least in part) divinely predetermined, 
an idea encapsulated by the later ‘Divine Right of Kings’ theory. 
 
Medieval Theory and Practice 
 
In conformity with Christian theology and Germanic as well as late Roman 
governmental practice, ideas of theocratic kingship emerged in Western Europe 
in the Early Middle Ages.9 One consequence of this development was that 
whereas God was considered to be the sole and omnipotent (or to put it in 
	
	
3 John McClelland, A History of Western Political Thought (Routledge 1996) 111. 
4 White (n 2) 158ff. 
5 Aristole, Politics [4th c BC] bk. I.2, 1252b, 1253a, reprinted in Richard McKeon (tr), The 
Basic Works of Aristotle (Random House 1941). See further McClelland (n 3) 111; White 
(n 2) 79ff. 
6 ‘Let every person be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no authority 
except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God. […]’ (ESV). See also 
White (n 2) 119ff. 
7 Martin Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (OUP 2010) 21ff. 
8 See Ken Pennington, ‘Law, Legislative Authority, and Theories of Government, 1150–
1300’ in James Burns (ed), The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought c.350–c.1450 
(online edn, CUP 2008) 426. 
9 More precisely, this has been dated back to the 7th and 8th century: Loughlin, 
Foundations (n 7) 25; or even further to the 5th century: PD King, ‘The Barbarian 
Kingdoms’ in Burns (n 8) 127ff. 
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modern terms, ‘sovereign’) transcendental authority,10 on earth such authority 
was shared with the monarch. The Church retained its position as both the 
mediator11 and the ultimate interpreter of an all-ordering divine will from which 
royal power was derived and to which it was subject. The result of this form of 
theocratic kingship was a dualistic structure of authority, figuratively expressed 
in the ‘Theory of the Two Swords’,12 according to which both the papacy and 
the royalty were divinely authorised to exercise spiritual and temporal authority, 
respectively.13 
This intertwining of Christian theology and politics found its most 
elaborate application in the structure of the Holy Roman Empire.14 In practice, 
however, there was no neat hierarchy in medieval politics. Rather, society was 
shaped by overlapping and competing jurisdictions, as well as by the 
interdependencies and power struggles between the main political actors: the 
Church, monarchs and local princes.15 Tensions arising from and attempts to 
stabilise this volatile framework would drive many of the developments of 
modern political thought. 
 
Medieval Notions of Law 
	
	
	
10 The German jurist Carl Schmitt would hence consider the modern concept of 
sovereignty to be a secularised version of this omnipotent power: Political Theology (first 
published 1922, Georg Schwab tr, University of Chicago Press 2010) 36. 
11 This mediating function found its symbolic explication in meticulous coronation 
ceremonies in which a dignitary would formally invest the king with regal power: 
Loughlin, Foundations (n 7) 26f. See also János Bak (ed), Coronations: Medieval and Early 
Modern Monarchic Ritual (University of California Press 1990). 
12 This distinction between a ‘spiritual sword’ and a (subordinate) ‘temporal sword’ was 
first formulated by Pope Gelasius (492–496?):  McClelland (n 3) 132f, and has famously 
been invoked eg by Boniface VIII (1294–1303) in his bull Unam Sanctam [1302], issued 
during his conflict with Philip IV of France. See Walter Ullmann, ‘A Medieval Document on 
Papal Theories of Government’ (1946) 61 The English Historical Review 180. 
13 The exact relationship between spiritual and temporal powers, however, was subject to 
constant dispute: HJA Watt in Burns (n 8) 367ff. 
14 John Neville Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings (first published 1896, Geoffrey Elton ed, 
Harper and Row 1965) 39. See also Loughlin, Foundations (n 7) 28ff. 
15 McClelland (n 3) 131-32. Kings had long relied on the Church’s prestige and 
institutions to govern effectively, while exercising considerable factual authority over it 
within their own realms, see ibid 131, 135. At the same time, for the exercise of actual 
(military) power, they relied on local princes, who owed them only limited allegiance, see 
ibid 278-79. 
 Order ,  Author i ty  and Law   [Vol. 2 
	
28 
Since medieval thought considered God to be the supreme legislator, any 
temporal law had to emulate or at least comply with His will.16 Hence, Thomas 
Aquinas (1225–74) could claim that compliance with temporal laws also meant 
obedience to divine law, since every (rightful) temporal law at least partly 
embodied it.17 Yet for a long time there was no clear conception of what ‘law’ 
actually was, or who made it.18 During the Early and High Middle Ages legal 
propositions were mainly drawn from customary or adopted sources, and the 
exercise of legal authority amounted to little more than casuistically applying 
these propositions. Those sitting in judgment faced a mixture of overlapping 
and competing systems and sources of law, including traditional (for example, 
Germanic) practices, Christian Canon Law, and – following the rediscovery of 
Justinian’s Digests in 1135 – Roman Law. In addition, the rediscovery of 
Aristotle’s Politics in the thirteenth century led to a revival of natural law 
theories.19 The cardinal ‘project’ of medieval legal scholarship was to reconcile 
these conflicting systems.20 
It is not clear when people began to conceptualise that they could actually 
‘make’ new law in the form of abstract rules. Terminologically, it was not before 
the late twelfth century that Canonists coined the term ius positivum to designate 
law promulgated by a human legislator.21 However, even Civilians at that time 
were divided about the relationship between deliberately drafted and existing 
customary law.22 And while Thomas Aquinas already clearly distinguished 
between divine and man-made law,23 definitions by Marsilius of Padua (circa 
1275–1342) only roughly resemble the modern categories of natural and 
positive law.24 In actual fact, for much of the Middle Ages even promulgated 
legislation was considered merely a representation of divine will.25 Before ideas 
of genuinely ‘positive’ law took hold, the concept of law hence retained a 
‘passive’ role in both political thought and practice. Firstly, it was regarded to be 
an emanation of a divinely predetermined order rather than a product of 
	
	
16 McClelland (n 3) 133. 
17 ibid 118. 
18 ibid 133, 140. 
19 Loughlin, Foundations (n 7) 34. 
20 Pennington (n 8) 425ff. 
21 ibid 425. 
22 ibid. 
23 White (n 2) 183ff. 
24 McClelland (n 3) 140-41. 
25 ibid 140.  
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political will. It could therefore, secondly, play only a limited role as a means of 
governance.26 
In the High Middle Ages, however, disputes about political power and its 
limits started to be expressed in legal terms. Canonists were among the first to 
make law central to their political theory.27 For instance, Thomas Aquinas 
expressed the relationship between God-given, natural laws and promulgated 
laws – that is, the limits of governmental power – in terms of legal hierarchy: in 
the case of conflict, promulgated law would be invalidated as leges corruptio.28 The 
exercise of political power was therefore subject to what would become known 
as ‘fundamental laws’ (leges fundamentalis). A similar use of legal terminology to 
express the limits to regal power can be seen in the writings of Henry de 
Bracton (1210–68).29 This trend towards legalisation provided the language for 
subsequent debates about political right and order. While in medieval times law 
had not yet become the ‘building blocks’ of political order, it already supplied 
the terminology in which the contours of political power were described.  
 
II. TRANSITION TO MODERNITY: AUTONOMISATION AND 
SECULARISATION OF THE POLITICAL 
 
The transition from medieval to modern political thought is closely linked to 
changes in the political landscape occurring towards the Late Middle Ages. 
These developments questioned existing doctrines and set off a re-
conceptualisation of both political order and law. 
 
Decentralisation and Consolidation of Political Power 
 
	
	
26 Certainly, apart from theoretical constraints, low levels of literacy and limited means of 
communication set very practical limits to the rule-making capacity of early medieval 
kings.  
27 Pennington (n 8) 427. 
28 Thomas Aquinas, Treatise on Law Q 95, quoted in J Budziszewski, Commentary on Thomas 
Aquinas's Treatise on Law (CUP 2014) 316. 
29 The Laws and Customs of England Vol. II (first published 1235, Samuel Thorne tr and 
George Woodbine ed, HUP 1968) 33; Loughlin, Foundations (n 7) 50ff. 
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From the mid-thirteenth century onwards, regional principalities and republics 
successfully began to claim political autonomy.30 Notably the French and 
English royalty – declaring themselves to be ‘emperors within their own 
kingdom’ (imperator in regno suo) – opposed both papal and imperial authority.31 
As was foreshadowed by the eleventh and twelfth century Investiture 
Controversy between the papacy and royalty over the power to appoint Church 
officials, monarchs increasingly attempted to control the Church within their 
own realms.32 These power struggles overlapped with and were closely related to 
the Protestant Reformation.33 The Reformation and subsequent religious wars 
led to increased political fragmentation (especially among the German 
principalities), and this decentralisation further impaired papal authority.34 The 
overall effect of these developments was a gradual dispersion of political power 
towards the regional polities and a concomitant increase in royal over religious 
authority. At the same time, within a given territory, governmental power was 
consolidated more and more in the royalty, at the expense of inferior feudal 
lords.35 
The political authority exercised by an increasingly independent royalty 
found its conceptual expression as ‘sovereignty’. The term – formerly 
synonymous with suzerainty36 – was used to describe a consolidated and 
independent political power, in contrast to the patchwork of competing 
authorities and jurisdictions that had shaped feudal systems.37 This modern 
notion of sovereignty is mainly attributed to Jean Bodin (1530–96), who defined 
sovereign power, held by the king, as ‘the absolute and perpetual power vested 
in a commonwealth’.38 Many commentators consider this idea of sovereignty to 
	
	
30 With a focus on northern Italy, Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political 
Thought Vol. 1 (CUP 1978) ch 1; further Chris Thornhill, A Sociology of Constitutions (CUP 
2011) 40ff. 
31 Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (OUP 2004) 74. 
32 McClelland (n 3) 131. 
33 This is perhaps most evident in the case of Henry VIII’s disengagement from the 
Catholic Church in the 1530s. On the Reformation’s political implications, see Quentin 
Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought Vol. 2 (CUP 1978). 
34 This loss of authority was ia explicated by the principle ‘“Whose realm, his religion’” 
(cuius regio, eius religio) in the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 as well as the Peace of Westphalia 
in 1648. 
35 Loughlin, Idea (n 31) 74. See also Skinner, Foundations Vol. 2 (n 33) ch 4 on the 
connection of Lutheran thought and absolutism. 
36 Loughlin (n 31) 73ff. 
37 See generally ibid ch 5; Loughlin, Foundations (n 7) 184ff.  
38 Bodin, Six Books of the Commomwealth bk I ch 8 (first published 1576, MJ Tooley tr, 
Blackwell 1955) 25. However, he recognized certain ’fundamental laws‘ (eg the Lex Salica, 
natural law and self-constraints), ibid 28ff; Loughlin, Foundations (n 7) 67ff. 
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be a linking element between medieval and modern political thought.39 Indeed, 
since it is agnostic as to where such authority was derived from,40 the concept 
paved the way for an abstract description of and theorising about political 
power. 
The decentralisation and consolidation of political power in the Early 
Modern Age also saw the emergence of the ‘state’ as a new form of political 
entity and object of theoretical discourse.41 As a type of political entity, it 
marked a scholarly shift of focus from a universal Christian ecclesia towards the 
individual polity and by the early seventeenth century had become the major 
object of political philosophy.42 This shift led to the re-emergence of 
comparative inquiry and the development of relative theories of political right.43 
As a concept, the ‘state’ was the result of an abstraction and institutionalisation 
of sovereign political power. As can be seen, for example, in Thomas Hobbes’ 
Leviathan, the state is conceived as an entity independent both from the people 
who established it and from the person(s) ruling it.44  
 
Explaining Political Order Anew 
 
The idea of sovereign states, independent especially from papal authority, could 
hardly be reconciled with existing Christian theology and feudal doctrines of 
political philosophy. Hence, new answers were needed as to (1) how political 
authority was legitimised; (2) what the rationale or function of political order 
was; and (3) where the principles of political order could be derived from. 
 
	
	
39 Notably Figgis (n 14) 258.  
40 ‘Sovereign’ authority could be conceived as divinely bestowed, as by Bodin (n 38) bk I 
ch 10 (p 40), or derived from a ‘social contract’ as by Hobbes, Leviathan (first published 
1651, CB Macpherson ed, 58th edn, Penguin Books 1985) pt II ch 18 . 
41 On the concept of ‘state’ see Loughlin, Foundations (n 7) 183ff; Oliver Beaud, 
‘Conceptions of the State’ in Michael Rosenfeld and Andreás Sajó (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP 2012) 269, 278ff. See also McClelland 
(n 3) 280ff on the historical development of the concept. On the peculiarities in the 
Anglo-American tradition see Beaud 280-81. 
42 Skinner, Foundations Vol. 2 (n 33) 349; Loughlin, Foundations (n 7) 161. 
43 See eg Bodin (n 38) bk II. See also the works of the French Legists (see n 73) and 
Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince (first published 1532, Peter Bondanella tr, OUP 2005) 7ff 
or Niccolò Machiavelli Discourses on Livy (first published 1531, Julia Bondanella and Peter 
Bondanella trs, OUP 1997). 
44 Hobbes (n 40) pt II ch 17. 
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From Descending to Ascending Delegation of Power 
 
Within the power struggles between the royalty and papacy, the question of how 
to legitimise political authority gained new significance. For the king to achieve 
substantive independence from the papacy, it was necessary to displace the 
notion that the Church was the medium through which divinely authorised 
authority was bestowed. While the Divine Right of Kings theorists reconciled 
theocracy with the idea of a sovereign monarch, the idea that would ultimately 
prevail in Western political thought and pave the way to a positive conception 
of political order was that of ‘popular sovereignty’.45 
The Divine Right of Kings theory subordinated clerical power to the king, 
who claimed supreme authority (plenitudo potestatis) in both political and spiritual 
matters.46 While the theory has its origins in Bodin’s idea of the monarch being 
divinely bestowed with sovereign power,47 it was discussed most extensively in 
England, where the theory was first explicitly set out by James VI and I (1566–
1625).48 Although it was a post-Reformation theory – defending increased royal 
power against the papacy and the Presbyterians49 – it drew on the medieval 
notion of an inherently consistent and hierarchical natural order to justify the 
monarchy as the God-willed form of government.50 The theory sparked fierce 
debate in England: it was opposed amongst others by John Locke,51 and 
defended by Edward Forsett and Robert Filmer.52 Yet its influence in this 
	
	
45 In this essay, the term ‘popular’ sovereignty will denote legitimisation of political 
authority ‘from below’ instead of by way of an external authority. For a discussion of the 
term’s conceptual ambiguities, see Loughlin (n 7) 186. 
46 According to Figgis, the claim for consolidated and independent power expressed in 
the Divine Right of Kings was a transition towards the modern conception of 
sovereignty, (n 14) 237ff; contra Gless Burgess, ‘The Divine Right of Kings 
Reconsidered’ (1992) 107 The English Historical Review 838ff. 
47 Bodin (n 38) bk I ch 10 (p 40). 
48 See James VI and I, The True Law of Free Monarchies (written 1598) in Joseph Tanner 
(ed), Constitutional Documents of the Reign of James I, A.D. 1603–1625 (CUP 2015). 
49 Burgess (n 46) 837. 
50 W Greenleaf, ‘The Divine Right of Kings’ (1964) 14 History Today 642, 646. A similar 
methodology is already underlying Bodin’s argument for monarchy, see his (n 38) bk V 
ch 1. 
51 John Locke, First Treatise of Government (first published circa 1681) ch 9 in Davit 
Wootton (ed) John Locke: Political Writings (Hacket 2003); Second Treatise of Government (first 
published circa 1681) ch 1 in Wootton.  
52 Edward Forsett, A Defence of the Right of Kings (first published 1624) 
<http://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo2/A10151.0001.001?view=toc> accessed 30 
December 2016; Filmer, Patriarcha, or The Natural Power of Kings (first published 1680) in 
Johann Sommerville (ed), Patriarchia and other Writings (CUP 1991). 
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country came to an effective end with the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89, after 
which supreme authority shifted from the king to Parliament.53 On the 
continent, however, it would be adopted by divine-right absolutists like Louis 
XIV (1638–1715). 
Instead of conceiving of political authority as being divinely bestowed, 
theories of popular sovereignty – emerging in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries – see it as originating from the uniting of a people under a 
commonwealth and subsequently commissioned by the populace to the ruler. 
Similar ideas of ascending delegation of authority existed since antiquity54 and 
had frequently been invoked in medieval practice, both to bolster a king’s 
authority (in elective or popular monarchies) or to oppose royal claims to 
absolutism.55 The modern idea of popular sovereignty is primarily attributed to 
the work of social contract theorists – notably Hobbes, Lock and Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau – which dominated political thought from the Reformation up until 
the mid-eighteenth century.56 Contractual language had been used before to 
describe governmental arrangements, either between political authorities57 or 
between a ruler and his subjects.58 However, such covenants were generally 
made within an existing political order.59 In contrast, modern contractual 
theories depict the very existence of political order as the product of a 
(hypothetical) contractual arrangement. Hence, despite considerable differences 
in their political thought,60 all contract theorists posit a pre-contractual, apolitical 
‘state of nature’.61 The establishment of government, marking the transition to 
	
	
53 See Burgess (n 46) 842ff on the theory’s development in England. 
54 Including in Germanic theories of kingship (see n 8). 
55 McClelland (n 3) 134; Greenleaf (n 50) 643 on the invocation of medieval notions of 
popular sovereignty by the Church to oppose the Divine Right of Kings doctrine in 
England. Similarly, on the continent, Protestant Monarchomachs like François Hotman 
and Juan de Mariana invoked popular sovereignty, exercised by the Estates General, to 
oppose claims to absolute royal power. 
56 McClelland (n 3) 172. 
57 E.g. royal coronation in exchange for military protection, ibid 172. 
58 See n 54; McClelland (n 3) 172. 
59 ibid 173. One notable exception is the Jewish narrative of the Israelites contracting 
with Yahweh to obey His will in exchange for habitable land: ibid 174f. However, here the 
content of the laws in question was not subject to bargaining: ibid 175. 
60 ibid ch 10–13 for an exhaustive comparison of the theories of Hobbes, Locke and 
Rousseau. 
61 Hobbes (n 40) pt I ch 13; Locke, Second Treatise (n 51) ch 2; Jean-Jaques Rousseau, The 
Social Contract (first published 1762, Maurice Cranston tr, 25th edn, Penguin Books 2004) 
bk I ch 8 . Yet, these theorists differ on how human life in such a state of nature would 
look. Notably Hobbes depicted life in the state of nature to be ‘solitary, poore, nasty, 
brutish, and short’, (n 40) pt I ch 13. Later writers were more optimistic, including Jean 
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the ‘civil state’, is achieved through a multilateral agreement between the 
people.62 As the institutors of political order, any political authority has to stem 
from the people and is either conferred or commissioned ‘upwards’ to the 
governmental entity. Therefore, social contract theories break with the 
assumption that political authority is derived from an external authority (God). 
It should be noted, however, that such theories are not necessarily secular: 
religion and divine law (or natural law) still played a role in some versions of the 
model, but only as a constraint on political power and not as its foundation.63  
 
An Immanent Rationale for Politics 
 
As discussed above, both the Reformation and the religious wars called into 
question the notion that government exists to serve transcendental aims. The 
tendency of governments in the Early Modern period to regulate subjects’ 
everyday lives further undermined the perceived connection between 
government and religion.64 At the same time, the consolidation of political 
power in governments and an increase in their regulatory capacity meant that 
claims at that time for a centralised (and often absolutist) government were at 
least partially catalysed by actual existential threats to the political order. For 
example, Bodin’s Six Books were written following the French Wars of Religion, 
Forset’s Defence of the Right of Kings in the aftermath of the ‘Gunpowder Plot’ of 
1605, and Hobbes’ Leviathan as a reaction to the English Civil War (1642–51).65 
Calls for a particular political order were thus framed not as a means of 
achieving salvation but as a means of offering protection against internal and 
external threats. While it might be argued that the desire for protection has 
always accounted for the emergence of governmental structures, social contract 
theorists were the first to declare the protection of citizens to be not only a 
government’s duty but the very reason for its establishment. They conceived of 
political association neither as an inevitable human impulse66 nor as divinely 
																																																																																																																					
Jacques Rousseau in his Discourse on Inequality (first published 1755, Maurice Cranston tr, 
Penguin 1984). 
62 See Hobbes (n 40) pt II ch 17; Locke, Second Treatise (n 51) ch 8; Rousseau, Social 
Contract (n 61) bk I ch 6. These writers differ however, as to whether the governmental 
institution created is also a party to this contract and hence subject to its conditions. 
63 Locke, Second Treatise (n 51) ch 11. 
64 Loughlin, Foundations (n 7) 63. 
65 ibid 64; Greenleaf (n 50) 646; McClelland (n 3) 193. Likewise, texts written during 
times of relative peace exhibit more sympathy for limited government, eg Locke’s Second 
Treatise (n 51), written after the Glorious Revolution. 
66 Contra eg Aristotle, see n 5. 
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prescribed, but as an act of deliberate, self-interested choice in order to secure 
individual rights, liberty, and property.67 In order to recognise such rights 
antecedent to the state, social contract theorists had recourse to natural law 
theories, which had become increasingly prominent ever since the rediscovery 
of Aristotle’s writings. Political order thus became orientated towards serving 
the individual as a bearer of rights.68 This marked a shift from an heteronomous 
and transcendental rationale for political order towards one which was 
endogenous and immanent, subservient to individual members and to the 
furtherance of the general good (salus populi).69 
 
Inherited and Designed Constitutions 
 
The emergence of individual polities further raised questions as to how – and by 
reference to which discourses – to derive principles according to which the 
polities were governed. After all, acceptance of a general notion of ‘public 
sovereignty’ neither prescribes a certain political structure nor necessitates that 
such a structure is open to deliberate design.70 Further, social contract theories, 
starting from a (hypothetical) ‘state of nature’, may be interpreted as merely 
describing social evolution or be disregarded as a purely theoretical construct.71 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the word ‘constitution’ was revived 
to refer to the political order of a given polity,72 and was used instrumentally, as 
a means of deriving the ‘proper’ principles of political order. 
One such attempt to reveal principles of political order by reference to the 
concept of a constitution was that of the sixteenth century school of the French 
‘Legists’. The Legists proposed that these principles should be drawn not from a 
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Treatise. Immanuel Kant went even further and elevated the good of the state to being an 
end in itself in The Metaphysics of Morals (first published 1797) pt II sec 49 in HB Nisbet 
(tr) and Hans Reiss (ed), Kant: Political Writings (2nd edn, CUP 1991) 142: ‘Salus republicae 
suprema lex’. 
70 McClelland (n 3) 146, 172. 
71 White (n 2) 228; McClelland (n 3) 180f. Kant, for instance, considered the ‘social 
contract’ as a hypothetical construct of reason (while accepting its normative 
propositions): Theory and Praxis (first published 1792) in Reiss and Nisbet (n 69) 79. 
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close interpretation of Roman Law, but from examining existing legal and 
political practices.73 Such an approach gave normative priority to custom and 
tradition over a priori reasoning about political right and order.74 It led to the 
emergence of lex terrae – a systemised ‘law of the land’ (rather than fragmented 
legal customs) elucidated through historical inquiry – alongside Roman and 
Canon Law.75 This historiographic methodology led to the development of the 
concept of ‘ancient constitution’— a set of traditional laws to which all 
governmental power was subject.76 Being derived from human customs and 
traditions, the idea of an ancient constitution positions political order as 
something essentially positive and man-made, thereby stripping it of its 
‘theological colouring’.77 However, the governmental arrangements so derived 
were not open to deliberate design but seen as the immutable product of 
(potentially immemorial) custom. Due to its inherently conservative attitude, the 
ancient constitution has often been invoked by writers in opposition to 
revolutionary developments, including Edmund Burke and Joseph de Maistre.78 
The concept took root in England especially, where similar historiographic 
methods had already been used to challenge the power of the Crown by 
invoking the (myth of an) ancient Anglo-Saxon constitution preceding Norman 
government.79 It would ultimately be superseded by the concept of 
parliamentary sovereignty, which retained the primacy of customary common 
law, but subjected it to Parliament’s power to amend.80 However, the notion of 
an ancient constitution survives in contemporary discussions regarding a 
‘common law constitution’.81 
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Others claimed that a polity’s constitution did not need to be derived from 
custom, but could be deliberately designed by (or on behalf of) the sovereign 
populace. The (revolutionary) thinking was that popular sovereignty could be 
exercised in one deliberate act of ‘constitution-making’. In doing so, the 
sovereign people would both constitute a political order and authorise political 
power. A constitution thus established would not be a bundle of habits and 
customs but a very concrete set of rules, often codified in a single constitutional 
document which derives its binding force not from metaphysical or historical 
authority but from being the product of a rational act of self-determination. This 
(capital-C) ‘Constitution’ would gain the status of fundamental law against 
which the legality of all governmental activity was to be measured.82 This notion 
– driven by political liberalism – became a tenet of eighteenth century 
‘constitutionalism’.83 The claim of a deliberately drafted Constitution to be 
supreme law, regulating a state’s political order and constraining even legislative 
authority, was first put into practice in 1789 in the United States’ Constitution.84 
It lay at the heart of the European revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century, in the course of which numerous further constitutional documents 
were drafted. Furthered by their success, constitution-drafting became, for all 
intents and purposes, a necessity whenever political order was meant to undergo 
considerable change. It resulted in several ‘waves’ of constitutionalisation over 
the last centuries, making it the predominant model of political order at least in 
Europe. 
These ideas were closely connected with theories about legitimate 
resistance against established governments.85 The people’s prerogative to 
disobey a government acting illegitimately was not a necessary incident of 
theories such as popular sovereignty or of the social contract. According to 
Hobbes, for example, sovereign power is permanently alienated from the people 
and is identical with (absolute) governmental power.86 The social contract is thus 
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irreversible and creates an unchallengeable sovereign.87 The notion of legitimate 
resistance to government, on the other hand, requires a conceptual distinction 
between government and sovereignty. Locke, for example, understood 
sovereign power to remain with the people, who merely delegate political 
authority but reserve the right to reclaim it if a government becomes 
corrupted.88 Similarly, Rousseau makes it clear that sovereignty is ‘inalienable’ 
and remains at all times with the people.89 This distinction was later elaborated 
by Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, who distinguished between constituent power 
(pouvoir constituent) residing with the people and constituted power (pouvoir 
constitute) exercised by government.90  
 
Positive Law and the Activation of Legal Discourse 
 
The changes which led to a re-conceptualisation of political order also impacted 
on the conception of law. This resulted in law’s positivisation and in what can 
be called an ‘activation’ of law and legal discourse. 
 
Positivisation of Law 
 
The decline of religion as a source of political authority meant that ‘divine law’ 
ceased, without more, to be automatically binding. Kings were now able to 
promulgate rules that were the products of political will as opposed to simply 
emulations of divine law or a codification of existing customary rules. This 
separation of political will from divine revelation could already be seen in the 
writings of Marsilius of Padua, who distinguished ‘law’ (man-made commands) 
from ‘justice’ (according to divine law).91 By the Late Middle Ages, promulgated 
law had generally become recognised as a source of law distinct from theological 
rules.92 The social contract theorists, for example, advocated a positive 
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conception of law, promulgated either by the populace93 or the government.94 
While ideas of divine law survived in the form of natural law theories,95 such 
laws were no longer considered to impede the validity of temporal laws. The 
case for the normative priority of promulgated law was especially strong once 
these laws were seen as expressions of popular sovereignty; a sentiment 
captured in Rousseau’s assertion that ‘the general will is always rightful and 
always tends to the public good.’96 
With positivisation, law became employable as an instrument of 
government.97 The ability to proclaim law that was independent from both 
external authority and material constraints marked an important step towards 
the autonomisation of the political. Michael Oakeshott therefore considers both 
the supremacy of positive law and its employment as an element of government 
to be essential characteristics of the modern European state.98 Simultaneously, 
since the legitimacy of positive law was no longer assessed by reference to its 
conformity with an external standard provided by divine or natural law, but by 
its quality as an expression of political will,99 rules of competence and procedure 
gained crucial importance.100 
 
Activation of Legal Discourse 
 
As discussed above, legal terminology had played a role in political discourse 
since the High Middle Ages. Hence, political changes were closely linked with 
developments in legal scholarship, which was deployed to provide theoretical 
justification for conflicting claims to power. Jurisprudence went from being a 
passive and descriptive discipline to one which was employed instrumentally to 
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buttress assertions of political authority. In doing so, legal scholarship would 
initially still draw on customary and inherited sources and not tamper with the 
overall premise of divine authorisation. For instance, during conflicts in the 
fourteenth century between the Empire and Northern Italian cities, the Codex 
Iuris Civilis was relied on by the Emperor’s jurists to justify imperial supremacy 
over the papacy. 101 At the same time, ‘post-Glossators’ challenged the literal 
interpretation and intellectual authority of the Codex Iuris Civilis102 and clerical 
scholars invoked customary authorities to oppose royal claims to absolute 
power.103 
As the importance of religion and customary law faded and the authority 
of positive law became acknowledged, political and legal scholarship adopted a 
truly prescriptive role, making claims for political order based on a priori 
reasoning. Accordingly, discussions now turned towards questions of 
governmental structure, revolving around (inter alia) the merits and detriments of 
elective and hereditary monarchy,104 limited and unlimited government and 
democratisation.  
 
III. MODERN CONSTRUCTIVISM AND ITS CRITIQUE 
 
As can be seen, the evolution of political theory from the medieval period 
through to modernity comprised a gradual process of secularisation, 
positivisation, abstraction, and legalisation. Initially, the decline of religious 
authority led to political order becoming perceived as a temporal as opposed to 
transcendental matter, detached from theological prescriptions and 
conceptualised in the institution of a sovereign state. Secularised rationalism and 
ideas of popular sovereignty – both of which were encapsulated in the concept 
of a social contract – led to a complete secularisation of political thought. 
Hence, by the eighteenth century religion was no longer a structuring force for 
political order.105 This allowed for a positive conception of the political. Due to 
the normative priority ascribed to rules which were deliberately drafted as 
opposed to gleaned from custom and tradition, formal ‘constitutional law’ (at 
least on the continent) was regarded as the essential constructive element of 
political order and a means to ‘elevate the [political] consensus … above the 
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fleetingness of the moment’.106 This concurred with a general trend towards 
positivism in European philosophy,107 which gave normative priority to rational 
deliberation over tradition and to deductive over inductive reasoning. This 
normative priority also found expression in an increased trust in positive law as 
a constructive force for society. Not only were ideas of political order expressed 
in terms of formal constitutional law: under a constructivist influence and 
equipped with enhanced rulemaking capacities, modern European states 
engaged in projects of comprehensive legal codification aimed at governing ever 
more aspects of their citizens’ lives.108 
 
Four Tenets of Legalised Political Constructivism 
 
The trajectory of Western conceptions of political order has culminated in a 
contemporary political philosophy which exhibits four main characteristics. 
Firstly, it is understood that political associations are founded on a rational 
choice to protect and enhance individual and collective welfare. Secondly, 
political authority is derived from the people (that is, through constituent 
power) and delegated from them to an instituted government. Thirdly, the 
emanations of government – its bureaucracy and institutions – are understood 
to be the product of deliberate design by or on behalf of the people. Lastly, 
positive (constitutional) law is employed as the primary means to create the 
political order and to regulate social affairs. Combined, these traits form an 
understanding of political power which I term Legalised Political 
Constructivism.  
 
Criticism of Legalised Political Constructivism 
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While Legalised Political Constructivism is today widely endorsed, its four tenets 
do not reflect one coherent theory. For one thing, they are a mix of both 
normative and descriptive features. This is unsurprising, given that the tenets are 
the result of multiple philosophical and jurisprudential ‘projects’ which may or 
may not tessellate. For another, since most of these projects were aimed at 
providing theories on how political order and authority can be legitimised, they 
cannot be expected to have exhaustive explanatory value. Disciplines such as 
sociology, political science and social psychology, whose focus is the empirical 
study of human behaviour, are more suited to explain political developments. 
Consequently, the tenets of Legalised Political Constructivism have been 
criticised on the ground that they fail to adequately explain actual political 
behaviour.109 In particular, the notion that political association is an act of 
reason, an idea which each of the tenets presupposes, was challenged by David 
Hume in the eighteenth century. Hume, an empiricist, dismissed the ideas of 
divine creation and a social contract, doubting the latter’s explanatory value due 
to a lack of empirical substantiation.110 Since apolitical ‘states of nature’, from 
which people consciously proceed to establish polities, have existed (if at all) 
since prehistoric times, Hume considers the concept irrelevant for the study of 
modern societies. Similarly, Immanuel Kant conceived of the social contract as a 
mere hypothetical construct of reason.111 As opposed to the contractualists, 
Hume considered self-interest to be a mere ‘secondary … principle of 
government’,112 holding that political power could never rest entirely on 
consent.113 In fact, modern social sciences have shown that human beings are 
naturally sociable beings who band together not in a deliberate act of pure 
reason but more or less impulsively.114 Hume’s scepticism about human 
rationality also leads him to question the assumption that the structure and 
institutions of government are completely open to deliberate design. He adopts 
instead the view that government structures evolve more or less naturally, in an 
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iterative process, over time, which leads him to once again assign normative 
value to evolved structures of government.115 
The most comprehensive critique of modern positivism, however, was 
formulated by Friedrich Hayek, based on the behavioural insight that human 
rationality is limited and that people rely instead on cultural rules of conduct.116 
In accordance with his general distinction between spontaneous (cosmos) and 
made order (taxis),117 he develops a conception of law and political order in 
which human behaviour is not predominantly guided by positive norms 
(‘legislation’, thesis) but instead by evolved cultural rules (‘law’, nomos).118 As such, 
the potential for positive constitution-making is limited, since structural 
constraints on governmental power are ineffective unless they are backed by 
cultural rules.119 At best, formal constitutional laws describe a ‘superstructure’ 
erected over an already existing legal system.120 Like Hume, Hayek’s critique 
gives primacy to evolved over positive rules.121 While the latter may interact with 
evolved rules,122 culturally evolved norms ultimately determine the contours of 
political order.123 
CONCLUSION: CONSTRUCTIVISM CHALLENGED? 
Starting from a medieval conception of divine prescription, the perception of 
political order has undergone a process of secularisation, positivisation, 
abstraction, and legalisation. In modernity, political order is conceived as a 
positive and legalised concept, detached from metaphysical influence and 
embodied in the institution of the state. 
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Government’ (n 112) 36. 
116 See Hayek, ‘Rules and Order’ (n 107) ch 1 (pp 10f). 
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(n 107) ch 17 (pp 441ff). On Hayek’s Model Constitution see Boykin (n 119) 22ff. 
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This abstraction, however, has led to a partial alienation of the political 
from the social. Since many of the assumptions underlying modern political 
thought were originally aimed at providing normative foundations for actual 
political events, they suffer from a moralistic fallacy: they purport to be 
descriptive when they are in fact normative. As such, they cannot adequately 
explain actual political behaviour. The critique offered by Hume and Hayek 
suggests that cultural rules have a profound impact on political behaviour and 
order. By way of example, the relevance of cultural codes of behaviour might go 
some way towards explaining the problems faced by projects which aim to 
promote the ‘rule of law’ by emulating Western institutional structures.124 The 
current authoritarian ‘backlash’ witnessed in some Central and Eastern 
European Countries125 further shows the limits of formal (constitutional) law 
for structuring political and social processes. While these insights are not overly 
surprising, they may – as it is most clearly expressed by Hayek – impact on 
existing assumptions about the relationship between positive law and political 
order. This is also true if one does not in reverse fall for a naturalistic fallacy by 
elevating actual political behaviour to a normative standard. 
Such tensions between established normative assumptions and modern 
empirical insights, however, are not unique to political philosophy. Similar 
challenges are faced by normative economics, which is to a great extent equally 
based on rationalist assumptions.126 At times, scholars’ attempts to construct 
governmental systems without paying due attention to existing social structures 
risks overlooking what Karl Polanyi describes, in an economic context, as 
‘embeddedness’. This is the notion that conventional economic activity is 
secondary to, and embedded within the confines of, existing social behaviour.127 
In the same way, in the political sphere, normative conceptions of political order 
may be subsumed by social codes of behaviour. When attempting to determine 
the role that positive law can (and should) play as a constructive element in 
politics and society, we might therefore be encouraged to look ‘over the rim of 
the tea cup’ and engage in an exchange with other disciplines. 
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